1. Warrant: A First Approximation, 3

I. Proper Function, 4

II. The Design Plan, 11

III. Reliability, 17

2. Warrant: Objections and Refinements, 21

I. The Design Plan, 21

II. Two Concluding Comments, 42

3. Exploring the Design Plan: Myself and My Past, 48

I. Knowledge of Myself, 48

II. Memory, 57

4. Other Persons and Testimony, 65

I. Other Persons, 65

II. Testimony, 77

5. Perception, 89

I. Perceptual Belief as Knowledge, 89

II. Perceptual Experience, 91

III. Perceptual Beliefs as Basic, 93

IV. Perceptual Beliefs Formed on the Basis of Experience, 98

V. Nature, Nurture, and Perceptual Judgments, 99

6. A Priori Knowledge, 102

I. A Priori Knowledge Initially Characterized, 103

II. A Priori Knowledge is Knowledge, 108

III. Fallibilistic A Priorism, 110

IV. A Priori Knowledge and the Causal Requirements, 113

V. Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete, 117

VI. Back to the Causal Requirement, 120

7. Induction, 122

I. The Old Riddle of Induction, 124

II. The New Riddle of Induction, 128

8. Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views, 137

I. Epistemic Probability and Statistical Probability, 139

II. Theories of Epistemic Probability, 142

9. Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth, 159

I. The Two Faces of Epistemic Probability, 159

II. An Account of the Normative Component, 165

III. Replies and Comments, 168

10. Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence, 176

I. Coherence and Foundations, 177

II. Evidentialism, 185

11. Naturalism versus Proper Function? 194

I. Naturalistic Analyses of Proper Function, 199

II. So What's a Poor Naturalist to Do? 211

12. Is Naturalism Irrational? 216

I. The Problem, 216

II. Darwin's Doubt, 219

III. A Preliminary Argument against Naturalism, 228

IV. The Main Argument Against Naturalism, 229

Index, 239