IF mind arrested itself at attuition, it would not question its immediate experience of either inner or outer feeling. It would then remain in a passive and godlike equilibrium, except in so far as it was involved in the promptings and disturbances of organic desires.1 The experience we should have gained would have yielded to mind as attuent, nothing but diverse shapes, vague coexistences and sequences in space and time, and more or less vivid relations of our organism to the satisfaction of its needs. Subject and object would be one in an important practical sense; for, although felt, they would not be distinguished and could not be separately affirmed. Mind would live in and through the object in contented tranquillity, reposing in the great binding fact of Being. As sentient, it is lost in the object alone: it is only on the higher plane of the Dialectic that the relation of subject and object becomes a question.
On this plane, a new event proclaims itself, as we have seen. This all recognise, and call the new event or fact evolved in the cosmic system, Reason; and then assign the name Man to the creature in whom it appears: appears as supreme and governing, as constitutive of Man as Man, and constitutive, therefore, of the possibility and character of his peculiar experience.
What precisely is it? Watch its genesis. Assuredly an activity; which, to distinguish it from the movement or conation of a merely attuent organism in search of the satisfaction of desire, we call pure activity. It is Will. This activity first seeks to affirm and complete its attuitional experience; but, when it has once started on its career, why not be content with the more exact discrimination and reduction to self of the sensates of attuition as realitas—phenomenon, and leave all else? The answer is, Because it brings with it—nay, it is—a dialectic or organising activity. It brings no fresh matter of experience into consciousness except itself; and this is always the same.
This new dynamic of mind we call “formal” because it is not itself the “matter” on which it directs itself: it can be so only by duplicating itself. We also say that, as formal, it is a priori, inasmuch as it is not a datum of recipience. As formal, what then is its essential Form as furnishing a priori forms generally? What does it contribute to our experience as question and answer? What does this eye of reason see to which the eye of sense is blind? What process does it move through that it may truly see? These are vital questions.
We call this Will-reason the subjective dialectic: it is the method of “knowing” experience, the movement whereby the “sensing” of experience is superseded—not abolished, but sublated. It is not put on the top of attuitional empirical mind, but evolves itself out of it and never leaves it. And this “knowing” of experience is simply the reduction of experience to the demands of the Dialectic itself which insists on living its own life, and on now playing the supreme cosmic role. It is necessary to the constituting of the unity, coherence and wholeness of experience: it insists on doing so.
Henceforth, accordingly, all our judgments are the analysis of complexes presented to attuition. We analyse the synopsis with a view to synthesis; for we are now more than intelligising animals: we are more than attuitional mind adapting itself to its environment and dynamically assimilating experience through unself-conscious psychical and dynamical movements. The subject, as conscious mind, exhausts itself within the sphere of merely animal potentiality: whereas man is, further, self-conscious. Let us again consider what the higher plane of subjective mind means, how it arises, what it implies, and its manner of dealing with the given real of attuition, outer and inner.
And first, I would consider the genesis of self-consciousness. By this we mean that the conscious subject becomes conscious of itself as its own object. The subject is not a datum to conscious subject (as external objects or inner feelings are data to a conscious subject), but is itself constituted by subject a datum or object to and for itself. There, surely, is an intense activity, an all-potent energy here. When we think of it, it never fails to impress us as an astonishing evolution of the great cosmic process within the specific being which we call Man. And if we dwell on it long enough, it fills us not only with wonder, but with a kind of fear. We contemplate with mysterious awe this new being, which is yet ourselves, and seems to be constituted by a free act within ourselves. It must mean much: it must mean everything for us. And if we look more closely to ascertain, if perchance we may, what is the essential characteristic of the new cosmic fact, we find that it is an evolutionary movement in and of the already existing conscious subject (or entity) itself, whereby it goes forth, under an impulse of pure formal activity with End implicit, to seize and divide all presentations, breaking up wholes that are merely “associated” dynamically, separating total complexes and the parts of each from one another in order to raise the attuitional synopsis to a synthesis, and so to transmute a mere total into a unity.
But first of all (logically speaking), subject must divide itself from itself. In the very crisis of the reflexing of a feeling in mere attuitional consciousness stirred from without, we found an automatic reflexive externalising of the recept as “object”; which object at the same moment returned, as sensate, into the subject. The subject was, in its turn, thereby implicitly affirmed, i.e., evoked as subject: implicitly affirmed, I say, for, as a matter of fact, it is only dimly felt; as by animals. So now, in the crisis of subject projecting itself as object to itself, the subject (now there to thought) returns into itself as its own object. We are evidently lifted here far above the plane of reflexive mind-action: the movement in and of the subject is an act emerging out of itself, uncaused, 2 or, rather, causa sui.
This pure act, as distinguished from the passivo-active or reflexive, I call WILL. There is no other name for it. It lifts me above attuitional experience: it is the possibility of me. Will (Boulesis) means free pure activity; and to speak of “free” will is a tautology. It is precisely here that we encounter Free Will in the man-organism; not in moral choice. If it is not here, in the primary act of knowing, it is nowhere; and man is then a dynamic organism, and nothing more. The motive force of action on the attuitional plane, on the other hand, is, inasmuch as it is not subject-originated, to be distinguished as Conation or “volition” (Thelema): it is not free, because it is determined by the dominant inner affection or external force that, for the time, occupies the area of the subject. To call it Volition, however, considering how this word is constantly applied, is misleading. Let us rather call it Orectivity or Conation—a movement from within the organism which is a reflex of the desired object; although it may also arise as an organic straining caused by a vaguely felt want. Animals, and we, while on the animal or attuitional plane, are conscious automata; and if my interpretation of the higher plane be false, we men are animals, but without their consolations and happy limitations.
We are now, then, evidently in presence of the most wonderful event within the experience of man. And that event is just Man. The conscious subject does not get itself split up into two halves, like a protoplasmic cell. There arises in the very heart of it a nisus, force, or energy, whereby subject throws the whole of itself out from subject and, eo actu, recovers itself as object into itself, while all the while it has never left itself. This energy emerging out of subject constitutes subject an “object”. It is the purest kind of knowledge. The whole is projected, while yet the whole remains as it was, and the projected whole doubles back on the whole that remains, and, at the very crisis of return, there flashes out the consciousness of “subject” as now transformed into a “self” or “ego”. Such appears to be the genesis of Ego. What was formerly merely a feeling of subject in antithesis to presented objects is now a perception of subject by subject. Formerly, I was a “subject-conscious,” now I am conscious of my “subject-conscious”. I am a double consciousness and always continue double—two natures constituting one person. There is a self-analytic process, and the synthesis of the moments of that process is Ego. Till yesterday the formula was “am”; to-day it is “I am”. The conscious individual, in brief, is now a self-identical person. What is this movement, this mysterious nisus that breaks one into two while it yet remains one, and synthesises the two identities into a new and third complex identity—Ego? It is Will; and if there be a pure act anywhere within the Absolute Whole, it is precisely here; or nowhere. What has hitherto been the feeling of self-sameness is now the perception and (consequent) affirmation of self—sameness—i.e., Personal Identity. The Kantian uses the term “experience” in too narrow a sense: we are now in presence of the supreme experience. Mind conditioned now becomes mind conditioning. It is creative and in the image of God.
I have been giving the natural history of a wonderful event which is the sole firm foundation of all true idealism in philosophy. Some would seem to rest their idealism on the ruins of the phenomenal. Others are satisfied with the proposition “All is Thought”. But how do you get this proposition? What is Thought? Under such a conception, I may be a mere instrument whereby Universal Thought thinks—a passing phase of an eternal consciousness. I would quite as soon be a helpless resultant of the conflict of atoms. My position in the cosmos would be the same,—a vehicle for the processes of something not myself. It appears to me that the only basis of an idealism that is spiritualism is to be found in the analysis of the spirit of man—an analysis that tells us that man is above natural processes, and, as transcendental Ego, is master of his fate. If the criticism of knowing does not reveal a pure Will-movement whose form is a dialectic emerging out of the attuitional or empirical subject, there is no basis for objective idealism which is not mere hypothesis and arbitrary dogma. To my mind, it appears that the only alternative to the doctrine set forth here is a dynamic or geometrical absolute system—either of atoms, or mind, or mind-stuff; it matters not a rush which. I am not an idealist because I label everything “mind”. The best outcome of this idealism is Deus as Natura, Natura as Deus; and who cares by which name the Whole is designated?
Moreover, the principle of what I consider to be true and genuine idealism is not a one conception, nor a tissue of conceptions, which would crush all the contents of experience within the walls of formal categories; but, by its doctrine of attuition and of Being, it comprehends, in its fullest sense, the world of feeling and the real in all its variety and affluence as ab initio given to self-consciousness, and not in it or of it; and, further, by the necessity of its origin and nature it is living, moving, ever-progressing Spirit.
(b) Growth of Self-Consciousness generally.
Man is an organism that evolves itself, like all other organisms, in Time. There is a graduated order in attaining to the full reach of himself. He does not become clearly and distinctly self-conscious all at once: there are degrees of consciousness, and there are also degrees of self-consciousness. He begins by absorbing the sensate or attuit—the object already in attuition but thrown back into space as object (or “thing-there”)—a process with which he, as specific man, has nothing to do. It is done in him and for him; but, now, actively discriminating it from other sensates by negating them, he, as Will, brings the sensate, as presented, a second time into sentient consciousness. The “relate” is thus a second time related to mind by this act proceeding from within the subject: it is re-duced into the conscious subject (where it had already found itself as a sensate), and, in the crisis of that re-duction, it is perceived and thereupon affirmed; or, rather, the crisis of that re-duction is percipience and consequent affirmation or judgment. Then as to the subject: the dim feeling of subject is now lifted up into the sensation of the subject—an awareness of a reality “here” as well as a something “there”. This is the first stage of self-consciousness in the child, and goes on repeating itself for long in the growing mind, until, finally, much concrete repetition stirs the subject to recognise itself in its very abstractness—to discriminate or separate itself from its own activity and all objects of that activity; and, at that precise crisis, subject prehends and perceives pure subject as such, and affirms it. Self-identity or Ego is now explicitly established. In Time, I say, this is the order; but the primary acts of prehending and perceiving and affirming outer objects by reducing them to the subject, as distinguished from the mere sensing of them—the re-ducing, in brief, of the sensate a second time to sentient consciousness, in the act of percipience, rests ultimately on an implicit consciousness of subject in its abstractness as object. For, how could I re-duce a sensate into the subject without implicitly, and therein, affirming the subject? Hence we say that self-consciousness is the logical prius of the possibility of discriminating, prehending, perceiving and affirming any object whatsoever, as distinguished from the sensing or attuiting of it. And self-consciousness, when it is explicit, is the constituting of self by self through a nisus within the subject, which is Will. If I deny this, I find myself left in the hand of cosmic forces which are not myself. Self is an illusion. Individuality I may have; selfhood not. I remain a mere aggregate of feelings, associations, and reflexive activities within a universal mechanical monistic process.
To speak of an empirical self-consciousness is a contradiction. There is an attuitional consciousness which is empirical; but in self-consciousness we rise to another plane of Absolute Being evolving Itself as finite mind.
(c) Range of Will as Percipience. Dialectic Percepts are Ultimates.
At this point, it is important to recur to our definition of the percipience, as distinguished from the attuition, of an object, and as primal function of the subjective dialectic. Percipience is the active discrimination of a fact in consciousness from all else, and its re-duction to the subject. Thus percipience is not merely of the outer, but of the whole realm of inner feeling; nor is it limited by this, but it discriminates and perceives the non-sensible implicates of the sensible object as given to it in the reason-act of subsuming that object. The Infinite, the objective dialectic, the idea, the teleologico-causal, the ideal of this or that or of the Whole, are all the progeny of the Dialectic. But these implicates are dialectically given as ultimates, as ground, and cannot turn round on themselves and re-think themselves as objects to themselves. This would be to sensualise them. The seeing of these ultimate categories is the point of arrestment for human thought; and they go, as we shall see in the sequel, to constitute the moments in the Notion “God,” who is thus a more assured possession of the human mind than anything else save its assurance of itself.
(d) Will as Root of the Subjective Dialectic—Free Will.
The inner nisus, whereby subject “perceives” object and finally perceives itself as object, is to be called Will, I have said. By what other name shall we name it? “Through absolute freedom,” says Fichte, “not by a transition, but by a leap do we raise ourselves to rationality”: Will is the spring-board of Reason.
This native energy, this actus purus, is in itself wholly inexplicable; it moves towards its primary ends—viz., percepts—after a dialectic form; and Will in this its dialectic process, constitutes what we call Finite Reason Self-consciousness is the subject willing to seize itself and, eo actu, raising subject into Ego. In ordinary percipience, we affirm an object as itself and not any other: in the percipience of self we affirm the subject as itself and not objects—not the phenomenal world of presentation.
Will, in the sense of arbitrary freedom of indifference, is not yet banished either from philosophy or from popular thinking. It is supposed to descend on this or that motive of action “of its own free will”. This blind Will is now, I suppose, expelled from philosophy. Again, it is said, Will is “determined,” inasmuch as it is always consequent on a judgment or act of reason: and, inasmuch as the matter and activity of reason are themselves determined outside pure Will, Will and its actuation are manifestly determined by that which is not our essential self. Thus we get a kind of mediated mechanicalism and fatalism. Will is simply intellect or reason, it has also been said, and with a great show of truth; but, all the while, reason and reasoning are regarded as a spiritual machine. The truth, I think, lies in our elucidation of the moments of mind. Will is not subsequent to, or consequent on, reason. It is itself root of reason. As Will, it wills Will; and, instinct with purpose, it moves to an end after a certain manner, and this is the whole essence of reason—the whole pure subjective dialectic—the sum of the a priori. Thus, Will always moves to its end by way of reason (of which it itself is first moment) and fulfils itself in its affirmed end, and in externalising the end in the act of “Willing” or “Volition,” the Will that initiated is still present, and is satisfied. Will, for example, always active as reason (not in reason, for it is itself first moment of reason) establishes this or that judgment, which remains with us as maxim and motive. Thus, a man called on to act, wills in accordance with the already ascertained judgment as motive. In doing so, he renews swiftly and almost sub-consciously the process of ascertaining that judgment, and carries forward into the actualisation of “willing” the Will that initiated the process whereby the judgment was originally affirmed. Thus it is that the actualised “willing” or volition of to-day may have been initiated as Will ten years ago. We are always free, in so far as we act in accordance with a principle that we ourselves have freely affirmed.
I will say no more about this subject-generated act of Will here save to point out that it contravenes the doctrine of Spinoza which says: “That alone is free which exists by the necessity of its own nature and of which the action is determined by itself alone”. Now, the whole world exists as a sum of individualities, and each individuality has its “own nature,” from the atom upwards. Each thing is “for itself” and seeks its own fulfilment according to the “necessities” of its own nature. A stone, a star, a mollusc, a dog, a man, all alike do so; but with a difference. Mind in each of these objects is subject to certain conditions and “laws” of existence (which so-called laws express its idea or essence), and each fulfils itself according to the necessities of its own existence—its inner and outer relations as determined in it and for it. In Man,—the new and startling product of the movement of the Eternal in Time,—the “necessity of his own nature” is precisely freedom in relation to all else that exists: his essence is just free activity. The Spinozistic expression ought perhaps to be: “That alone is free which exists according to (the necessity of) its own nature and of which the action is determined by itself alone”. The necessity or essence of man's nature is free activity; and he is a “man”—a personality, as distinguished from a mere individuality, only in so far as all his acts are determined by this free activity—knowing acts as well as doing acts. It may be said that every atom or monad is free; but man differs in this, that he propounds his own ends and constitutes himself. The essence or idea of man, in brief, is precisely this Will-nisus and its implicit dialectic; and to this central fact the interpretation of all experience must conform or confess its impotence. Man finds his fulfilment only in accordance with the necessities of his own essential nature—the prime necessity being free activity controlling and co-ordinating all data of experience: that is to say, the whole realm of attuition—the inner and outer world of sense. From the point of view of The Absolute, man's essence is, of course, a necessary and determined fact; but the essence being once constituted, it has to work from its own centre of freedom as the very essence of its essence, and to exercise supremacy over all other finite things within its orb of dominion, including its own attuitional and empirical subject. In this necessity lies the moral “ought”; and what I ought to do in any particular case is that which free-functioning reason affirms to be the law, or essence, or truth—the “must” of the situation.
Accordingly, whatever the Absolute Being or “The Absolute” may be, so far from our being under compulsion to regard Him (or It) as an irresponsible mechanism who or which must by the necessity of his or its nature wind up his world, including all possible individual activities, like a clock, and then let it run down, we are forced to regard it as the source of freedom in the creature man. Within the vast Orb of the Absolute there is freedom in the form of finite reason. This involves a contradiction only if we first posit a one all-embracing necessary process which excludes the possibility of free finite activities; and thus, in face of fact, beg the whole question.
I do not affect a knowledge of Absolute Being. The simple fact that the man-sphere is relative to the whole Orb of Being, makes a synthesis of the Absolute impossible; and yet we forget that in such questions as that which we have just been considering, when we demand to know the “relations” of the Absoluto-infinite Will to the finite will, we are gratuitously positing the possibility of absolute knowledge of The Absolute. So with many other unsolvables. Does any man believe that we can so transcend the limits of our finite spirits as to solve (par exemple) beyond all question the mystery of evil, pain, and death? All our solutions are mere glozings, save when we frankly accept our world as a world of contradictions in which final solutions are pointed to and predicted, but assuredly not effected. If we cannot answer such questions, what is all our toil over The Absolute worth? We have been sometimes told, for example, by way of explanation of Death as extinction, that The Absolute cares only for the type and is regardless of the individual! This is all very well for The Absolute, but what is that to me? Huxley well says, somewhere, that it can be little consolation to the primaeval horse struggling distressfully for a precarious existence in some dismal swamp, to know that ten million years after he is dead, his evolved descendant will win the Derby. But while all synthesis of the Absolute, I repeat, is impossible save as a faith, an absolute synthesis of our own orb is possible; and within that I assuredly find the free energising of the Subject (now to be called Ego) as central and dominant fact—essence of the creature man. Somehow or other this is reconciled in the universal scheme with the “necessary nature” of The Absolute. By what right do I preclude such a possibility? What right have I to say that the nature of The Absolute is a necessary nature? What do I mean by a “necessary” nature, and so on? If I only mean that God is not contingent in the sense of being dependent on some other which is prius, the term is in its place; but let me keep to this meaning. His world however comprehends Contingency.
Man, let us conclude, is a Will-dialectic or Will-reason.
(e) Further Considerations.
A few further considerations in confirmation of our position that Will is root (or, let us say, nerve) of Reason are worth stating.
We may well be satisfied with this stupendous consummation of Will reason in us; but the mind of man does not halt even here. It arose out of the indeterminate: it must pass again into the indeterminate and unconditioned; and this it does in the apprehension of Absolute Being by finite mind as it stands, still straining, on the utmost verge of Reason. Will-reason cannot otherwise be satisfied. Even in this life there awaits us the supra-rational Intuition of The Absolute, as we may in the sequel see.