Definition of Religion.
Definition of Religion why wanted.
IF the Science of Religion is to be treated as one of the natural sciences it is clear that we must begin with a careful collection of facts illustrating the origin the growth and the decay of religion.
But we shall find it impossible to do so unless we first enter on a preliminary and I must add a somewhat difficult inquiry namely What is meant by religion. Unless we can come to a clear understanding on that point we shall find it impossible to determine what facts to include and what facts to exclude in collecting our evidence for the study of religion.
What then is religion? To many people this will sound a very easy question as easy as the question What is man? Practical people object to such questions and consider any attempt to answer them as mere waste of time. Now it is quite true that there is a kind of public opinion which for all ordinary purposes settles the meaning of words and by which we may allow ourselves to be guided in the daily concerns of life. But in philosophical discussions this is strictly forbidden. What is philosophy but a perpetual criticism and correction of language and the history of philosophy but a succession of new definitions assigned to old and familiar terms?
Great differences in defining Religion.
Besides there is anything but agreement on the true meaning of religion. Most people whatever their opinions might be on other points would probably hold that religion must always have something to do with God or the gods. But even that is not the case. Buddhism for instance which is a creed professed by the largest number of human beings recognises as taught by Buddha Sâkyamuni no god or at all events no creator of the universe and it has been held in consequence that Buddhism could not be called religion.
Is Buddhism a Religion?
Now it is quite true we may so define religion that the name could not be applied to Buddhism; but the question is who has the right so to narrow the definition of the word ‘religion’ that it should cease to be applicable to the creed of the majority of mankind? You see that the right of definition is a most sacred right and has to be carefully guarded if we wish to avoid the danger of mere logomachies. How often have I been asked Do you call Buddha's religion a religion do you call Darwin's philosophy philosophy or Wagner's music music? What can we answer under such provocation except Define what you mean by religion define what you mean by philosophy define what you mean by music and then and then only we may possibly come to an agreement as to whether Buddha's doctrines may be called religion Darwin's writings philosophy and Wagner's compositions music. I know full well that nothing irritates an adversary so much as to be asked for a definition; and yet it is well known or ought to be well known that definition formed the very foundation of the philosophy of the ancients of Socrates Plato and Aristotle while the absence of proper definitions has been and is still the curse of modern philosophy.
Definition of Definition.
But before we can give a definition of religion we must first give a definition of definition itself however pedantic such a request may appear.
There are at least three kinds of definitions the etymological the historical and the dogmatic.
Many people still imagine that an etymology is in itself a definition. This was an impression which prevailed widely in early times before the true principles of etymology had been discovered; and it prevails even now though there is no longer any excuse for it. Homer for instance is very fond of etymologies which are to account for the peculiar character of certain gods and heroes. Plato extends this practice even more widely though he often leaves us in doubt whether he is really serious in his etymologies or not. You know how in his Cratylus (410) he derives ἀήρ air from αἴρϵιν to raise as the element which raises things from the earth; how he explains αἰθήρ ether as ἀϵιθϵήρ because this element is always running in a flux about the air (ἀϵὶ θϵι̑ ἀέρα ῤέων). He derives θϵοί the gods also from the same root θϵι̑ν to run because he suspected as he says ‘that the sun moon earth stars and heaven which are still the gods of many barbarians were the only gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes; and seeing that they were always moving and running from this their running nature they called them gods or runners; and afterwards when they had discovered all the other gods they retained the old name.’ Aristotle was more sparing in his etymological definitions yet he too derived αἰθήρ the ether from ἀϵὶ θϵι̑ν because it was always running and moving.
The Romans followed the example of the Greeks. Poets like Lucretius and Ovid indulged in etymologies whenever they seemed to agree with their opinions and to the latest times Roman lawyers delighted in supporting their definitions of legal terms by more or less fanciful derivations.
In India also these etymological definitions were recognised from the earliest times. They are generally introduced in the following way: ‘This is the saddle-hood of a saddle that we sit on it’; ‘this is the road-hood of a road that we ride on it’; ‘this is the heaven-hood of heaven that it has been heaved on high.’ Only while these etymologies are historically correct any etymology is welcome to the authors of the Brâhmana or the Nirukta if only it explains some meaning of the word.
In some cases these etymological definitions are very useful but they require the greatest caution. First of all many popular etymologies are phonetically untenable and historically wrong. God for instance cannot be derived from good because phonetic laws will not allow it and because the two words run parallel and never approach one another as far as we can follow their history.
But even where an etymology is unassailable on phonetic and historical grounds it can never give us more than the first starting-point of a word. It may teach us how the object to be named was first conceived but no more. We know for instance that deus in Latin represents the Sanskrit deva perhaps also the Greek θϵός though neither of these etymologies is in strict accordance with phonetic rules and that deva meant originally bright. This is extremely important as showing us that one of the many conceptions of the Divine started from the concept of bright and beneficent beings such as sun and moon and stars in opposition to the dark and deadly aspects of the night; but to imagine that this could help us to understand the concept of God in the mind of such a thinker as Pascal would be absurd. We can never be too grateful if we can discover the germinal idea of a word if we can prove for instance that deus was originally no more than a bright being that a priest was originally an elder a minister a servant a bishop an overseer; but if we were to give these etymologies as more than historical curiosities and mistake them for definitions we should only prove our ignorance of the nature of language which is in a constant state of ebb and flow and exhibits to us the process of continuous evolution better than any other part of nature.
We now come to historical definitions. What I call an historical definition is an account of these very changes which take place in the meaning of a word so long as it is left to the silent and unconscious influences which proceed from the vast community of the speakers of one and the same language. Thus an historical definition of deus would have to show the various changes which led from deva bright as applied to the sun the dawn and other heavenly phenomena to the Devas as powers within or behind these heavenly bodies and lastly to the beneficent agents in nature or above nature whom the Hindus called Devas and the Romans dii. As the biography of a man may be called his best definition what I call biographies of words are perhaps the most useful definitions which it is in our power to give.
Lastly come the dogmatic definitions by which I mean definitions given on the authority of individuals who whatever a word may have meant etymologically and whatever it may have come to mean historically declare that for their own purposes they intend to use it in such and such a sense. This is chiefly done by philosophers lawyers and men of science who feel unable to use important words with all the vagueness of their etymological and historical meaning and determine once for all generally by the old logical method of settling their genus and their specific difference in what exact sense they ought to be employed in future.
Let us now see how these three kinds of definition have been applied to the word with which we have to deal namely religion.
Etymological Definition of Religio.
The etymological definition of religion has attracted considerable interest among theologians owing to that kind of tacit persuasion that the etymology of the word must somehow or other help to disclose its real meaning. It is well known that Lactantius derived religio from religare to bind or hold back and he did so not simply as a philologist but as a theologian. ‘We are born’ he says ‘under the condition that when born we should offer to God our justly due services should know Him only and follow Him only. We are tied to God and bound to Him (religati) by the bond of piety and from this has religion itself received its name and not as Cicero has interpreted it from attention (a relegendo).’
Before we examine this etymology it will be useful to give the etymology which Lactantius ascribes to Cicero and which he is bold enough to reject. Cicero says: ‘Those who carefully took in hand all things pertaining to the worship of the gods were called religiosi from relӗgere—as neat people (elegantes) were so called from elegere to pick out; likewise diligent people diligentes from diligere to choose to value and intelligent people from intelligere to understand; for in all these words there is the meaning of legere to gather to choose the same as in religiosus.
Let us first clear the ground of some statements which are repeated again and again but which have really no foundation. It is often said that Varro supports the etymology of Lactantius but Varro simply treats of lӗgere and lӗgio and thus supports indirectly the etymology of Cicero rather than that of Lactantius.
Festus again if he is to be quoted at all as having given an etymology of religio sides with Cicero and not with Lactantius for he says that people are called religiosi if they make a choice (delectus) of what has to be done or to be omitted in the worship of the gods according to the custom of the state and do not entangle themselves in superstitions.
Of later writers St. Augustin follows sometimes the one sometimes the other derivation as it suits his purpose; while among modern theologians it has actually been maintained that religio was descended from religare as well as from relegere so as to combine the meanings of both.
From a purely philological point of view it cannot be denied that religio might have sprung from religare quite as well as from relegere. The ordinary objection that from religare we should have religatio and not religio has no real weight for we find by the side of opinari such words as opinio not opinatio and necopinus; and by the side of rebellare rebellis and rebellio. In lictor also if it meant originally a man who binds the criminal we should have to admit a root ligere by the side of ligare.
The real objection to our deriving religio from religare is the fact that in classical Latin religare is never used in the sense of binding or holding back. In that sense we should have expected obligatio or possibly obligio but not religio. Cicero's etymology is therefore decidedly preferable as more in accordance with Latin idiom. Relegere would be the opposite of neglegere or negligere and as neglegere meant ‘not to care’ relegere would naturally have meant ‘to care’ ‘to regard’ ‘to revere’. From a verse quoted by Nigidius Figulus from an ancient writer and preserved by Gellius (iv. 9) we learn that religens was actually used as opposed to religiosus. He said: Religentem esse oportet religiosus ne fuas ‘it is right to be reverent but do not be religious’ that is superstitious.
The German word Andacht literally thoughtfulness then reverence has sometimes been compared with religio but there is a slight difference for Andacht conveys the meaning of meditation rather than of regard and reverence.
There is one more etymological definition of religion which Gellius (iv. 9) ascribes to one Masurius Sabinus. He derived religiosum in the sense of sacred from relinquere to leave or put aside as something too sacred for ordinary purposes. As phonetic laws would not allow of this derivation we need not discuss it further.
So much for the etymology of religio which in its first conception can only have meant respect care reverence.
Historical Definition of Religio.
We now come to what I called the historical definition or what others might prefer to call an historical description of the fates of the word religio while confined to its own native soil. Most words particularly those which form the subject of controversies have had a history of their own. Their meaning has changed from century to century often from generation to generation; nay like the expression of the human face the expression of a word also may change from moment to moment. In one sense our historical definition may be called the biography of a word and if only it can be recovered with any approach to completeness such a biography conveys to us more information than can be gathered from any logical or etymological definition.
So long as the word religio remains on Roman soil all changes of meaning seem perfectly intelligible if only we take into account the influence of those forces which determine the growth of meaning in all words. Afterwards when the word religio is transferred from a Roman to a Christian atmosphere from classical to mediæval Latin and the modern Romanic dialects from popular parlance to technical theology the case becomes different. We then enter on purely dogmatic or self-willed definitions the natural growth of language seems arrested and all we can do is to register the various meanings which have been assigned to the word religion by philosophers and theologians of authority and influence.
Tracing the history of religio we find it used in Latin in its original and wider sense of regard or respect in such expressions as religio jurisjurandi reverence for an oath as distinguished from metus deorum fear of the gods.
Religio and metus occur frequently together for instance Cic. ii. in Verr. 4 45 101 ut eam (cupiditatem) non metus non religio contineret where we can translate the two words metus and religio by fear and awe fear expressing the fear of men or of consequences awe the fear of the gods. It is said in another place that when the moon was suddenly eclipsed on a clear night the whole army was perturbed religione et metu by awe and fear. Such expressions also as religio est facere aliquid do not refer to religious scruples only but to any qualms of conscience.
After a time however religio became more and more defined as the feeling of awe inspired by thoughts of divine powers. Thus Cicero states religio est quae superioris cujusdam naturae quam divinam vocant curam caerimoniamque affert ‘Religion is what brings with it the care and cult of some higher power which they call divine.’ As we find here religio and caerimonia placed side by side we find likewise cultus and religio joined the former expressing the outward the latter the inward worship of the gods.
A distinction is soon made also between religion and superstition as Cicero says nec vero superstitione tollenda religio tollitur ‘though superstition should be removed religion is not.’
Lastly religio and also the plural religiones became the recognised names of outward religious acts of cult and ceremony. Thus Cicero distinctly explains religio by cultus deorum and he declares that the religion of the Romans is divided into sacra sacrifices and auspicia observations of the flight of birds to which a third part has been added namely when the interpreters of the Sibyl or the haruspices declared something for the sake of prophecy from portenta and monstra. The auspicia he supposes to have been founded by Romulus the sacra by Numa. In another place he distinguishes superstition from religion quae deorum cultu pio continetur ‘which consists in the devout worship of the gods.’ We meet even with such expressions as religio deorum immortalium i.e. the worship of the immortal gods.
So far we can watch the natural development of the word religio in Latin. It began with the meaning of care attention reverence awe; it then took the moral sense of scruple and conscience; and lastly became more and more exclusively applied to the inward feeling of reverence for the gods and to the outward manifestation of that reverence in worship and sacrifice. There are some late writers who use religio in the sense of faith; for instance Cassiodorus (died 562 A.D.) Religionem cogere non possumus quia nemo cogitur ut invitus credit ‘We cannot force religion for no one is ever forced to believe against his will’: but in classical Latin religio never has that meaning.
Thus ends the biography of the word religio so long as it lived its natural life unchequered by technical definition. We can clearly see that what the Romans expressed by religio was chiefly the moral or practical not the speculative or philosophical side of religion. The questions as to the existence the character and powers of their gods did not trouble their minds so long as they were left to themselves; still less did they make their sense of moral obligation which they called religio dependent on their faith in the gods only. They had a feeling of awe in their hearts at the sight of anything that seemed to them overpowering and beyond the grasp of their senses and their understanding. They did not care much whence that feeling arose but they called it religio that is considering thinking twice hesitating; that was enough for them. The idea that the gods had implanted that feeling in their hearts or that a thing was wrong or right because the gods had forbidden or commanded it did not occur to them till they had come in contact with Greek philosophy. Their religion if we may use that word in its later and far more general sense was very much what Spinoza in his Tractatus theologico-politicus thinks that practical religion ought always to be simple piety and obedience as distinguished from philosophy and love of knowledge. The gods were accepted without any misgivings their approval of what was right and good was taken for granted and no further questions were asked. So great is the difference between religio as understood by the Romans and religio as commonly understood by us that religio Romana would never have conveyed to Cato the idea of his knowledge of Jupiter Mars or Vesta and the duties he owed to them but rather that of ancient Roman piety. There is a well-known verse by Schiller:
‘Which religion I have? There is none of all you may mention Which I embrace and the cause? Truly religion it is.’
Here he uses religion in the first line in a purely modern sense in the second line in a truly classical sense. What he meant was that he was held back by awe by reverence and humility from deciding on the truth of any single form of faith and this the Romans too might have called religion.
French has in some expressions retained the classical meaning of religio. In such a phrase as Il a une religion inviolable pour sa parole we recognise the Latin religio jurisjurandi.
Later meanings of Religio.
We now have to follow the word religio in its later wanderings. Transferred to a Christian soil religion became really a foreign word and as such had to be defined by those who used it and chiefly by theologians and philosophers. We naturally look first to the Old and New Testament to see in what sense religion is used there. But in the translation of the Old Testament the word religion never occurs and in the New Testament it occurs three times only; and in one of these passages the translation varies between religion and superstition. In the Acts of the Apostles xxvi. 5 we read: ‘I lived a Pharisee after the most straitest sect of our religion.’ Here religion in the Vulgate religio corresponds to the Greek θρησκϵία which means outward worship of the gods. In the Epistle of St. James (i. 26 27) we have θρησκϵία religious worship and the adjective θρη̑σκος which is rendered by religious in the Vulgate by religiosus.
In the Epistle to the Galatians (i. 13 14) the translation the ‘Jews’ religion’ is meant to render the Greek ᾽Ιουδαϊσμός which is retained in the Vulgate as Judaismus. Lastly in the Acts xxv. 19 ‘they had certain questions against him of their own superstition and of one Jesus which was dead whom Paul affirmed to be alive’ we have in Greek δϵισιδαιμονία which really means the fear of the.gods and which the Vulgate translates rightly by superstitio the Revised Version less correctly by religion..
In all these passages what is intended by religio as used in the Vulgate is a system of religious belief and worship; no longer what was meant by religio in its classical sense. The nearest approach to religio in its original meaning is found in the Greek ϵὐσέβϵια. The verb σέβομαι expressed at first being awestruck standing back with awe. Thus σέβας μ᾽ ἔχϵι ϵἰσορόωντα meant ‘awe holds me back while I behold.’ It afterwards is used for reverence towards the gods. Thus ϵὐσέβϵια Ζηνός is used by Sophocles (Electra 1097) in the sense of reverence towards Zeus and the same word with the preposition ϵἰς occurs in the sense of piety towards parents as in Plato's Republic 615 C ϵὐσέβϵια ϵἰς θϵοὺς καὶ γονέαβ. After Homer we find σέβομαι used with the accusative like veneror for instance σέβομαι θϵούς I worship the gods.
At first the Greeks used δϵισιδαιμονία fear of the gods or of the demons and ϕοβϵι̑σθαι τὸ θϵι̑ον to fear the divine power in a good sense. But very soon δϵισιδαιμονία was used in a bad sense as superstition so that Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (161-180 A.D.) speaks of θϵοσϵβὴς χωρὶς δϵισιδαιμονίας god-fearing without superstition.
We have now to consider the third class of definitions which I called dogmatic. They differ from the etymological and historical definitions in that they give us the opinions of individuals whether theologians or philosophers who take upon themselves to say not so much what religion does mean or did mean but what it shall mean. There is generally something dictatorial in such definitions. I open the pages of a philosophical journal and I find in close proximity the following definitions of religion: ‘Religion is our recognition of the unity of nature and teaches us to consider ourselves as parts of the whole; and who can doubt its strong influence upon all our conduct!’ On the next page I read ‘Theology and Metaphysics have nothing to do with Morality’ and soon after ‘Religion has never been other than science plus worship or emotion.’
We can hardly open a book without meeting with similar random definitions of religion. Religion is said to be knowledge; and it is said to be ignorance. Religion it; said to be freedom and it is said to be dependence. Religion is said to be desire and it is said to be freedom from all desires. Religion is said to be silent contemplation and it is said to be splendid and stately worship of God. People take every kind of liberty with this old word. Young poets will tell you that poetry is their religion young artists that their religion is art while it has been said of old that ‘pure religion is to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction and to keep yourselves unspotted from the world.’
We cannot contest the right of every one to define religion as he understands it. For see how the matter stands with regard to definition. We have the etymological meaning of religion but that is not binding; and we have the various historical meanings of religion and they again are not binding. What criteria then can we discover for testing the truth of what I call the dogmatic definitions of religion? Some are clearly far too narrow others far too wide. Some are faulty in themselves others prove deficient when we try to apply them to historical facts. We must examine the most important of them and though such an examination even of the most important definitions only will no doubt occupy some time we ought to remember how often a whole dialogue has been devoted by Plato to this kind of philosophical reconnoitring and ought not to grudge the time which we have to devote to this preliminary inquiry.
Religion and Theology.
In conducting this inquiry we must be careful in the choice and use of our own words and we must try as far as possible to use every word in one sense only. We must distinguish for instance between religion and theology though these words have often been used promiscuously. By religion we should always understand the subject itself by theology the study or science of that subject. This terminology so far as the word theology is concerned has prevailed ever since the time of Abelard and there seems to be no reason for changing it.
The Greek word theologos was used originally in a different sense. Thus Homer and Hesiod were called theologi (Herodotus ii. 53) not in the modern sense of theologians but as conversant with the origin and history of the gods. Hesiod's Theogony might have been called his Theology or at all events a part of it and that name is applied to similar works such as the Theology of Thamyris and of Orpheus who is specially called ὀ θϵολόγος by the Neo-platonists. Plato and Aristotle used theology in the sense of ‘doctrine concerning Deity and Divine things’ λόγοι πϵρὶ του̑ θϵου̑ καὶ πϵρὶ τω̑ν θϵιω̑ν.
In Latin theologia was taken by Varro in the sense of what we call religion there being according to him three kinds of theology the mythical the physical and the civil. The mythical theology contained the fables about the gods and many things we are told contrary to the dignity of immortal beings. The physical theology was described by him as beyond the capacity of the vulgar while he considered the civil theology the received religion of Rome as best for a good citizen to believe.
In Christian phraseology theologos meets us first as the name of the author of the Apocalypse John the Divine or the theologos. This name however we are told was given to him not simply because he was what we call a theologian but because he maintained the divinity of the Logos. In the third and fourth centuries theologos is said to have meant usually one who defended that doctrine.
Later and particularly during the middle ages theology came to mean religious doctrine in general as studied by theologians or priests and Abelard's Theologia Christiana was meant to represent what was afterwards called Summa theologiae a body of systematical knowledge concerning Christian religion.
Dogmatic and Practical Religion.
The fashion which prevailed for some time particularly in Germany of using religion in the sense of practical and moral religion while reserving theology as a name of dogmatic religion is objectionable and can only create confusion. We may distinguish between dogmatic and practical religion and we may equally distinguish between dogmatic and practical theology. But as a theologian is now always used in the sense of a man who studies religion professionally or who belongs to the faculty of theology it will be best to reserve theology as a name of this study. A mere believer in the dogmas of any religion is not yet a theologian. I therefore propose to retain religion in its general sense comprising both dogmatic and practical religion and reserve theology as the name for a scientific study of both. This will prevent all misunderstanding unless we prefer to drop the name of theology altogether and replace it by the name of the Science of Religion.
It is likewise a mere abuse of technical terms to speak of Comparative Religion. There is religion and there is a science of religion just as there is language and a science of language. But no one would speak of Comparative Language; neither ought we to speak of Comparative Religion. It is different with mythology. Mythology may be used not only for a collection of myths but likewise for a scientific treatment of them and in the latter sense therefore it would be correct to speak of Comparative Mythology.
We have thus far distinguished between:
Religion dogmatic and practical and Theology dogmatic and practical.
To some philosophers and theologians also such a division between practical and dogmatic religion seems objectionable nay impossible because they maintain that morality cannot possibly exist without some belief in a divine or at least a rational government of the world and that dogma again would be useless unless it became the motive of practical morality. This may be true but we need not enter into that question at present for by simply qualifying religion as either dogmatic or practical we only distinguish we do not separate; and without committing ourselves as yet to any opinion as to whether morality can exist without dogma or dogma without morality we do no more by our nomenclature than admit the existence of a common element in both.
Schleiermacher's Definition of Religion.
Some philosophers however and particularly Schleiermacher claim the right of using religion in a still higher sense. They deny that religion is either dogmatic or moral; they deny also that a combination of dogma and morality would give us religion. They point out that when we say that a man is without religion we do not mean simply that ho does not believe in Judaism Christianity or any other form of faith or declines to submit to their moral codes. We mean really that he is without any religious sentiment. Schleiermacher explains religious sentiment as being the immediate consciousness that all that seems finite is infinite that all that seems temporal is eternal. ‘To seek and find what is infinite and eternal in all that lives and moves in all changes and chances in all doing and suffering in fact by an immediate sentiment to have and know life itself as the infinite and eternal life that’ he says ‘is religion.—‘From that point of view if once reached all events become real miracles all miracles become real events; all experience becomes revelation all revelation experience.’—‘If we do not see our own miracles around us if we do not perceive within us our own revelations if our soul does not yearn to draw in the beauty of the whole world and to be pervaded by its spirit; if in the highest moments of our life we do not feel ourselves impelled by the divine spirit and speaking and acting from our own holy inspiration if we do not at least feel all that we feel as an immediate influence of the universe and yet discover in it something that is our own that cannot be imitated but can prove its pure origin within ourselves we have no religion.’
We shall have to consider this meaning of religion when we come to examine the Upanishads the Vedanta philosophy the poetry of the Sufis and the speculations of the mediaeval mystics; but it seems to me that it would be better if a different name could be assigned to what may be the highest height which religion can reach but is nevertheless a complete transfiguration rather of human nature than a system of doctrines about the Divine and a code of precepts inspired by our belief in the Divine. In German it is called Religiosität; in English religiousness or devotion might be used in the same sense.
Religion either belief or body of doctrines.
We have still one remark to make with regard to the ordinary use of the word ‘religion’ before we can feel ourselves properly equipped for grappling with the great historical definitions of religion which have to be examined. Like many terms of the same character religion can be used either for our own intellectual possession of theoretic dogmas and moral principles or as a name of a body of doctrines and precepts collected by authority chiefly for the purpose of teaching these doctrines and practices. Thus we may say that a person has changed the Jewish for the Christian religion that is to say that he has changed his own religious convictions. But we may also say that a person is studying the Buddhist religion either by reading the sacred books of the Buddhists or by watching the life of the Buddhists in Ceylon or China without allowing these studies to exercise the least effect on his own convictions. This ambiguity can hardly be avoided and we have to make allowance for it in all branches of knowledge. We speak of logic meaning either the laws of thought as we know and follow them ourselves or a body of doctrines contained in essays and manuals; and we shall have to bear in mind the same double meaning when we speak of religion.
A strict adherence to the terminology as we have now explained it will help us I hope to avoid many misunderstandings and enable us at the same time to assign to each of the various definitions of religion its proper place.