In the second of a three-volume modular approach, Plantinga continues his investigation into one of the most fundamental questions of epistemology since Plato: what precisely is a warrant? Before something is held to be true, it must be justified or warranted, and yet the contours of a warrant are not fully clear. Plantinga explores the basic parameters. Cognition must be functioning properly (and functioning for the cognitive environment for which it was de-signed), the original plan of design must a good one, its relevant modules aimed at truth, and the objective probability of a belief being true (depending on all these underlying factors) must be high. In rejecting an internalist and naturalist view, Plantinga turns to theism. If warrants are to be understood, they need to be found in a naturalistic epistemology that is set in the context of supernatural theism.

KEY WORDS: Epistemology, Warrant, Theism, Internalism, Foundationalism, Naturalism, Descartes, Perception, Purpose, Knowledge: self, way of memory, of others, Belief, Reliability